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ABSTR ACT: Existing empirical literature on business models is still inconclusive about
the key drivers of successful business model transformation. The paper explores this issue by using a single longitudinal case study design in combination with grounded theory
approach on a medium-sized, high-tech and globally oriented company. Based on on-site
visits, interviews and secondary documentation data analysis, the study identifies six generic drivers of successful business model transformation: transformational leadership,
discovery driven decision-making, industry improvement – customer specific orientation,
content-oriented communication, self-initiative collaborators, and phased separation
strategy. The new drivers supplement our existing knowledge on how successful transformation takes place and add to existing drivers, while extensive discussion of their implications may help the managers to execute business transformations more effectively.
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INTRODUCTION
The question of how to transform a business model to spur technology improvements
within an existing and highly profitable business model has not yet been addressed.
Existing empirical research on internal drivers of business model transformation (hereafter
BMT) focuses on the process of experimentation (Achtenhagen, Melin, & Naldi, 2013;
McGrath, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010), leadership characteristics (Doz & Kosonen, 2010;
Foss & Stieglitz, 2014), and capabilities of managing two business models simultaneously
(Casadesus-Masanell & Tarzijan, 2012; Khanagha et al., 2014). Understanding what drives
successful BMT is especially important in strategic alliances where small and medium hitech companies with innovative technologies complement their capabilities with those of
their strategic partners (Medcof, 1997). While such partnerships can be highly profitable,
partners might unilaterally embark on a transformation, which is not driven by the
desire to have greater profit but to maximize their technological potential. Little is known
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about what makes BMT successful or not, especially over time. Moreover, a systematic
examination of the relevant drivers of BMT and the kinds of change they cause is missing
from existing business model literature (Saebi, 2014). Although many researchers have
been exploring the process of business model innovation, the less innovative but highly
demanding process of BMT is still largely under-researched, especially in long-term
partnerships. Current research gives primacy to the external context as the driver of
business model change with little empirical evidence on key internal drivers and their
interdependencies (Martins, Rindova, & Greenbaum, 2015).
The objective of our study was to explore the key drivers of successful BMT. The main
research question was: ‘What are the key drivers of successful business model transformation?’
To explore the research question, we developed a longitudinal single-case study design
based on an inductive field study of a globally oriented high-tech company. This paper
contributes to the knowledge on business model dynamics by addressing the issue at hand
from a long-term perspective. Based on information gathered from multiple sources, we
identified six drivers of successful BMT. Thus, our paper advances the theory of business
model change/transformation. We conclude the paper by discussing our findings and
highlighting their implications for managers and academics.
1 LITERATURE REVIEW
A general consensus exists that a business model is oriented towards creating and
delivering value to customers (Demil, Lecocq, Ricart, & Zott, 2015), and capturing value
for the organization (Massa & Tucci, 2014). Business model change is the process by
which the management deliberately and actively (Doz & Kosonen, 2010) alters established
intra-organizational and/or extra-organizational systems of activities and their relations
to environmental changes (Bucherer, Eisert, & Gassmann, 2012), and is mainly launched
by reacting to technological and market-related forces (George & Bock, 2011) and by
refocusing from an organization-centric to customer-centric business model (McGrath,
2010).
In the lifetime of a company, the initial design of its very first business model is based on a
variety of external and internal factors (George & Bock, 2011); however, the ongoing search
for a better competitive position often forces companies to change this model (Chesbrough
& Rosenbloom, 2002; Markides & Sosa, 2013). There are three theoretical perspectives on
business model change: (1) rational positioning view, which represents a search for a new
optimal design that repositions the firm in response to any kind of significant changes in
its environment; (2) the evolutionary view, which sees business model development as an
initial experiment followed by constant fine-tuning and learning, and (3) the cognitive
view, which advocates that business model change is a consequence of managerial mental
models, which accrue due to changes in the environment. These perspectives emphasise
the external context as a driver of business model change and offer limited insight into the
internal drivers of successful business model change (Martins et al., 2015).
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While there are different interpretations of business model change (Aspara, Lamberg,
Laukia, & Tikkanen, 2013; Doz & Kosonen, 2010; Markides, 2013; Massa & Tucci,
2014; Sosna et al., 2010), authors agree that business model change is likely an ongoing
process (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2011; Khanagha, Volberda & Oshri, 2014) partly
characterised by demanding (Aspara et al., 2013; Sosna et al., 2010) and partly by finetuning changes (Cavalcante et al., 2011). Business model change activities can range
from incremental changes in individual components of business models right through
to innovative disruption of core elements of a firm and its business logic (Bucherer et al.,
2012). To differentiate business model innovation from other types of business model
change, we followed the concepts defined by Massa and Tucci (2014). Business model
design relates to newly formed firms and business model reconfiguration to established
ones. Along with business model innovation, these two concepts are part of the business
model change concept; similarly, business model innovation is part of a broader concept
of BMT.
The capabilities required to successfully utilise different types of business model change
include evolutionary, innovative, and adaptive change capabilities (Saebi, 2014). BMT
combines adaptive change capabilities and directed transformation to respond to
technological changes (Khanagha et al., 2014).
When dealing with two competing business models, which seems to be the dominant
approach in managerial practice (Bucherer et al., 2012), there is a need for recursive
iterations between different modes of separated and integrated structures in line with
the emergent nature of strategic intent toward the new business model (Khanagha et al.,
2014). To manage two business models simultaneously, a company has to design a context
allowing it to achieve a delicate balance. On one hand, it has to create enough distance
between the two business models so that they do not suffocate each other, and on the other
hand, it has to keep them close enough to exploit synergies between the two (Markides &
Sosa, 2013). Working with a new business model requires experimentation and divergent
thinking that can be better achieved by flexible and decentralized structures; in addition,
continuing with the existing business model requires focus and is better accomplished via
efficient and centralized structures (Khanagha et al., 2014).
In the experimentation research stream, creating, identifying and experimenting with new
business opportunities has been confirmed as a critical capability in a longitudinal study of
25 small and medium-sized firms (Achtenhagen et al., 2013). The study showed that highly
entrepreneurial experimenting is related to market research, new ideas and accepting
failures—these were treated as a basis for learning. It has been shown that organizations
learn more from failures than successes and that knowledge from failures depreciates more
slowly that knowledge from successes (Madsen & Desai, 2010). The acquired knowledge
from experimenting subsequently allows exploring alternative approaches to value
creation (Sinfield, Calder, McConnell, & Colson, 2012) and successful business model
development (Sosna et al., 2010). Focused commitment to one single business model in
combination with simultaneous experimentation can influence the long-term survival of
ventures operating in uncertainty (Andries, Debackere, & Looy, 2013).

106

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS REVIEW | VOL. 18 | No. 1 | 2016

In the leadership research stream, the founder’s vision has been found to importantly
influence business model development and change (Chesbrough & Rosenbloom, 2002).
Strategic sensitivity, which includes sharpening foresight in seeing the needs for a BMT,
has been suggested as leadership meta-capability (Doz & Kosonen, 2010). In addition
to achieving coherence between active and clear leadership, a strong organisational
culture and employee commitment have also been recognized as a critical capability
(Achtenhagen et al., 2013). Four roles (monitor, sponsor, moderator, and architect role) of
top management in leading business model change are proposed regarding the intensity
of the business model change (Foss & Stieglitz, 2014).
Due to technology development, many companies are forced to run two business models
simultaneously. In the managing two business models simultaneously research stream,
researchers find that companies can run two business models also when they see the
opportunities of serving two different customer segments. In such cases, business models
can complement each other, for example in the case of LAN airlines (Casadesus-Masanell
& Tarzijan, 2012). Four possible strategies for managing dual business strategies are
proposed (Markides, 2013); however, complete separation has not been found as the
optimal structural approach for dealing with two competing business models (Khanagha
et al., 2014). The need for recursive iteration between different modes of separated and
integrated structures in line with the emergent nature of strategic intent toward the new
business model was highlighted.
The collaboration with customers research stream underlined the need for rethinking
the generation of ideas and bringing them to the market. This led to the concept of open
innovation and open business models (Chesbrough, 2003) with nine different research
streams of which the user perspective is one of the best-researched fields (Gassmann,
Enkel, & Chesbrough, 2010). The bibliometric review of the concept of open innovation
reveals that it is mainly, but not exclusively, rooted in technology and innovation
management literature, with a strong focus on the user-centric perspective (Kovacs,
van Looy, & Cassiman, 2015). For example, the exploratory study of 605 innovative
SMEs in the Netherlands highlighted that they are practicing open innovation activities
extensively and increasingly. Open innovation in these firms was operationalised in the
field of technology exploitation and technology exploration (van den Vrande, de Jong,
Vanhaverbeke, & de Rochemont, 2009). A study among contributors of freely submitted
designs for a jewellery company highlighted the importance of co-creation and its impact
on the quantity and quality of designs submitted (Füller, Hutter, & Faullant, 2011).
Previous studies do not provide evidence of a business model change taking place in the
strategic alliance separation of a medium sized high-tech company. Leadership focus
studies have a limited range (Foss & Stieglitz, 2014) and do not reveal the kinds of leadership
style (Yukl, 2010) appropriate in an alliance-related BMT. Often, the focus tends to be
on structural solutions while other elements rounding up the company’s organisational
context, such as values, vision, incentives, people and culture, are underexplored. Whether
cooperation with customers in such a delicate situation has a significant impact on the
success of a business model transformation has yet to be investigated.
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2 METHODOLOGY
A qualitative research approach with two commonly used methods for inductive research
was applied: (1) single case study, justifiable when the research of a topic is at its early stage
(Eisenhardt, 1989), is representative, and serves a revelatory and longitudinal purpose
(Yin, 2009); and (2) the grounded theory methodology (Glaser & Holton, 2004) in order
to assure qualitative rigour in conducting the research (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2012).
We adopted the stance of “theoretical agnosticism” (Charmaz, 2006).
2.1 Case description
The case study involves a medium sized and innovative hi-tech company Dewesoft, which
changed its business model to ensure the maximization of its technological potential. In
fact, its potential was locked and under-exploited under the first business model when the
company was strategically aligned with its Austrian partner. This case is unique in that
no other cases known in literature dealing with BMT simultaneously involve strategic
alliance separation; therefore, the decision for the single case was justified. During the
BMT period from a strategically aligned DAQ SW company to an independent total
solution company, Dewesoft established its own global sales network in 38 countries and
introduced over 45 innovative DAQ HW measurement instruments perfectly fitted with
their own DAQ SW to the market. It completely changed its sales model, a fact reflected
by the total turnover achieved at the end of 2014 (€10.7M), which is 7.64 times more
compared to the turnover at the end of 2007 (€1.4M). In addition, the company raised the
employee added value from €98,800 (2007) to €150,800 (2014), even though the average
number of employees in the Slovenian head office increased from 9.6 to 38.3.
2.2 Data collection
Data collection included multiple sources of primary and secondary data in three research
sequences (for details on research sequences, see Appendix 1). In the first research
sequence, we used three unstructured interviews consisting of an opening question and
followed by probe questions which focused on the company’s early development stages
and BMT perceptions. Interviews were complemented with an on-site visit and informal
discussions. Because the BMT was still in progress, we recognised that interviewing
only executives and having no access to internal documentation may not yield entirely
accurate data. Comprehensive external documentation examinations were carried out
between the first and the second data research sequences, and primary data was also
collected. This allowed us to draft the first BMT process and its key drivers. Publicly
available external documentation included newspaper articles (interviews and company
presentation), media accounts (TV), strategic partner’s annual reports, secondary survey
data from the project Gazele, graduation theses of Dewesoft’s employees, and the financial
database Gvin.
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After a period of establishing trust, Dewesoft’s CEO and CTO expressed a willingness to
disclose their internal archives. The second research sequence included additional two
interviews with executives, a review of internal documentation (business reports, financial
reports, company’s presentations, e-mail correspondences, operational guidelines,
catalogues, company website, and company video and photo materials). In addition, three
informal conversations with executives were carried out.
The second draft of BMT with tentative drivers of success, produced at the end of second
research sequence, encouraged the company’s CEO and CTO to ‘open the door’ to other
informants, allowing us to broaden our social interactions. In the third research sequence,
18 semi-structured interviews with four groups of other informants (cofounders,
experienced engineers, employees, and partners) were conducted, lasting from 30 up to 60
minutes each. They were transcribed on the same day. Except for interviews with partners
which were performed at their locations, all interviews were conducted at Dewesoft’s head
office. We were also invited to four company meetings; in addition, we had four informal
conversations and were engaged in informal social gatherings relevant to our research
question. Altogether, more than 200 pages of transcripts were accumulated. The time
period for internal sources used was 2003-2014, and for external sources it was 2001-2014.
All interviewees were aware of our role in the study and voluntarily agreed to participate
in it.
2.3 Data Analysis
The analysis was structured following continuous interplay between data collection
and analysis and permitted us to follow the leads that emerged (Charmaz, 2006). In
the first data collection period, we familiarised ourselves with the data collected, then
analysed interview transcripts and investigated the data from on-site visits and informal
conversations to highlight any inconsistencies requiring further examination (Eisenhardt,
1989). With an early analysis, we coded the data to summarize, interpret, and classify
information (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The main topics covered were identified and
resulted in 291 insights emerging from transcription. Also, a common set of terms was
determined, resulting in 29 broad categories that were further analysed for similarities
and shared characteristics, ultimately leading to the generation of 6 main categories which
served as constituent parts of the first tentative model of key drivers of successful BMT.
The coding process was exploratory, relying on informants’ wording.
In the second research sequence, we transcribed and coded—independently from the
previous findings—a new set of interview data, personal observations, and excerpts of
internal documents. This resulted in 140 insights, which emerged from the transcription.
Another feature of this sequence was that we presented the first tentative model of key
drivers of successful BMT to the executives after conducting interviews with them. The
model was formulated based on the findings of the first research sequence. In the ensuing
discussion, 3 major research categories out of the proposed 6 were confirmed as suitable
work concepts. The tentative work model was created without analysing internal company
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documentation because we only obtained access to it in the second research sequence.
This means that we relied on cross-period analysis in which the insights from the first
research sequence were compared to the insights from the second one. This resulted
in additional vital information that enabled us to understand the broadest context of
the company’s operation. By identifying patterns and their connections, and exposing
illustrative quotations and thoughts, we condensed the information into 5 tentative
drivers by the end the second research sequence. The drivers were presented to executives
and confirmed by them.
By the end of the third research period, a wealth of new data and input into the course
and consequences of BMT was made available for research, so we decided to once again
recode all the available information. The new coding yielded a total of 322 content codes.
An ensuing process of finding interconnections between content blocks produced 17 subcategories that were streamlined into 6 main categories.
3 RESULTS
Figure 1 presents the structure of data after the third research sequence. Illustrative
content codes are shown with two items for each sub-category (see Appendices 2 and 3 for
the coding sample and a range of illustrative quotes and observations). The formulation of
main categories is outlined in Table 1.
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Figure 1: Data Structure after the Third Research Sequence
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Table 1: Drivers of BMT and their subcategories
Transformational leadership
• Technology vision: Long-term understanding of the direction of the company’s
technological development and the ability to transfer this vision to all involved
parties.
• High quality focus: A focus on creating above-average products and innovative
services that exceed the expectations of the consumer.
•W
 orld view: Fundamental philosophical orientation of the company that guides the
pace, course and intensity of its business operations.
Discovery driven decision-making
• Effectuating / experimenting: The constant development and execution of new modes
of operation with the intent of acquiring experience and information for the purpose
of successful decision-making.
• Agile deciding: Ability to adopt BMT decisions that are of current strategic importance
to the company.
Industry improvement - customer specific orientation
• Customer value proposition: Clever way of offering added value to end users.
• Customer – co-creation: Encouraging the active cooperation of customers and
partners in the process of constant product improvement, so that end users (and sales
agents) have a say in how technological solutions are designed.
• Industry value sharing: Ensuring that solutions developed for specific purposes are
then accessible to everyone.
Self-initiative collaborators
• Engagement: Selection and development of personnel that proactively strives to realize
the company’s technology vision, on the individual as well as team levels.
• Internal knowledge sharing: It is of key importance to create an atmosphere that
encourages each individual to contribute their maximum share to the realization of
common goals and stress the importance of everyone’s involvement.
• Fast and innovative development: The ability to perform fast and innovative
development is tied to the upgrading of existing products and the utilization of a
broad mix of industry knowledge and expertise.
Content-Oriented Communication
• Customer-focused communication: Using effective means to inform customers
continuously and at the right moments about possibilities for future development.
• Sales partners-focused communication: Ensuring conditions for the establishment of an
effective network of sales partners willing to work with a young company on the rise.
Phased Separation Strategy
• Sensing: Executives carefully observe all the moves and decisions conducted by the
former strategic partner and regularly adopt counter-measures.
• Making distinction: Ability to differentiate the company from the former strategic
partner, coupled with the audacity to compete on the same market.
• Development of missing capabilities: Capabilities that were assured by the former
strategic partner had to be developed.
• Ambidexterity: Ability to share resources between the old and new business models
during the period of transformation.
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3.1 Transformational leadership
A number of statements emphasise that the CTO Jure Knez is the undisputed leader of
the company and that his personal example propelled the realization of the enterprise’s
technological vision and guided employees throughout the course of BMT. A perceived
danger to the realization of the technology vision was in fact one of the key causes for the
necessity of BMT, and the leadership’s ability to openly communicate its perspective and
work hand in hand with employees was one of its key facilitators. The company cofounder
stated in his interview: “We’re tremendously fortunate to have the opportunity of working
with Jure, as he’s someone that will go above and beyond his duties to make sure we stay
on top”. The realization of the technology vision went in harmony with a focus on the
gradual but persistent achievement of state-of-the-art quality and product performance.
One example is their software for the acquiring, processing and display of data, which is
still the same core product it had been at the company’s establishment, and one they are
constantly updating. An important element of the leadership charisma was the CTO’s
particular world view, which is well illustrated by his answer to a journalist, asking how he
sees the individual’s ability to change the world: “Being small compared to the rest of the
world isn’t an excuse to stay passive. Everyone should do their best to pitch in, help out
and make the world a better place, then it all adds up.”
3.2 Discovery driven decision-making
Participants in our research believe that their willingness to accept risk and experiment
with business practices and technological innovation was essential for the success of BMT.
The research further established that the executives did not know how it would look and
function once transformation was complete. Many decisions were made on the basis of
“as-you-go” information and understanding developed from experimenting and the will
to pursue ideas. Experimenting comes with unexpected outcomes but results in useful
experience both ways, and interviewees shared a belief in leadership that embraces the
possibility of negative outcome. “Even today, we can’t say for sure we’ll be staying afloat, but
the environment changes all the time anyway. It’s a sin not to try new things, don’t you think?”
There is another case, which shows the willingness for experimenting. Dewesoft tried their
hand at online sales, which proved to be far less successful than they had envisioned. One
executive commented: “When we looked at the success of our internet sales, we were forced
to admit they were a failure. And we had to cancel them, sure. But it all ended up being the
first step on our way to independence.” Each of the company’s experiments was followed
by an analysis of its effects and the adoption of new decisions, which normally ended up
being of strategic importance to the company and carried over to the transformation of
the strategic model. Thus, failure to reach good sales online helped leadership decide to
establish the company’s own sales office in Austria.
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3.3 Industry improvement - customer specific orientation
On the basis of all the evidence acquired in the interviews, observations and analysis of
company documentation, we established that the company is not only focused on creating
added value for their customers, but is also extremely willing to listen to their feedback
and incorporate it into solutions which then manage to push technological boundaries.
Looking at the information we acquired, it is accurate to state that the company created the
added value on the basis of technological perfectionism and innovation, pricing policy, a
free-of-charge bundle of extra services that provided customers with updates, maintenance
and technological upgrades distributed to everyone, as well as a free software package
for the analysis and display of data once it was captured by the Dewesoft measurement
software. Co-creation with their customers in the development of solutions had always
been their trait, but prior to strategic separation, they did not have direct enough access
to the customers to perform it to a satisfactory degree. During the BMT, Dewesoft turned
what seemed like a shortcoming into an advantage.
The company’s accessible and responsive orientation was also confirmed by one of
the customers, who said: “Dewesoft reacted right away to our particular needs, and the
other makers didn’t, so it became a pretty easy choice looking forward ... and that’s why
we chose them.” Based on the collected information, we were also able to ascertain that
their next dimension of industry improvement—customer specific orientation—is aimed
at the development of industry-wide solutions that push the technology forward for all
users, promoting fundamental development. Cutting-edge design rests on systematic
technological development, coupled with a broad understanding of end-user issues
and expectations as well as a close understanding of the industry as a whole, through
cooperation with top experts in the field of automotive, aircraft, space and power
technology fields. As the CEO said: … “It was shocking to find out even NASA was prepared
to let us make the products we developed specifically for them available to everyone else. We
don’t believe in exclusivity in science. Everything we ever developed became an update to our
core software. 15 year later, we still keep upgrading the same one. And all the improvements
are public, freely available to anyone who ever purchased our product.” The approach that
adds all customer-specific solutions to the core software package used by everyone makes
it incrementally more capable and reliable, in turn attracting a wider and wider circle of
customers.
3.4 Self-Initiative Collaborators
The entrepreneurship logic of Dewesoft is characterized by the significant autonomy of
each employee, coupled with extensive encouragement of proactive contribution to the
company’s goals on both the individual as well as team levels. On the other hand, the
ability to co-create applicative research for major global companies provides a high degree
of personal motivation to ambitious young engineers, who are eager to excel and prove
their professional worth, or as one of them said: “When I was at the fair and saw just how
much famous companies value Dewesoft’s solutions, it made me rethink my work ethic, and
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since then I want to do my best even if I have to be here all day...” The willingness to actively
share personal expertise is also one of the most outstanding personal traits of the CTO,
and this attitude is carried over to those working in the same environment. Dewesoft
leadership offers guidance to personnel and expects them to share knowledge between
one another, creating a culture of learning not only in the company’s internal dealings but
also in its relationship with customers and suppliers. The value of knowledge exchange is
confirmed by numerous interviewee statements: “The first thing we teach our employees
is how to fly by themselves, and if they need directions, they can ask,” as the CTO stated.
One employee confirmed this sentiment by saying: “I really appreciate that everybody was
willing to help me when I started working for the company”, while another told: “Since I was
employed here, I feel like my mentor gave me so much experience...”
3.5 Content-Oriented Communication
Focus on strategic, planned, diverse and constant communication with customers and
sales network partners was seen as another vital factor in the success of Dewesoft’s BMT,
according to the gathered information. A new period in communication began in early
2008 with the website redesign and the promotion of the company’s first independent
measurement instrument, which received the Nasa Tech Briefs prestigious Product of the
Year 2009 award. That year, the company also opened its sales office in Austria and one of
the cofounders remembers: “In 2009 we published our first catalogue which featured just a
few HW pieces, but it was a necessary start to approaching the customers and sales networks”.
All these activities served to inform the customers, and some were also aimed at
reinsuring them that Dewesoft was able to independently develop capable noncompeting instruments which it was offering at the time. Once it was made clear that
complete separation from the former strategic partner was unavoidable, the approach to
communication with customers and the sales network was refocused on Dewesoft as an
independent provider of quality hardware in combination with excellent SW for turn-key,
easy-to-use measuring solutions.
Dewesoft also began organizing regular measurement conferences (taking place in 2011,
2013 and 2015) at the location of the company’s head office where they invited their
customers and business partners. The primary purpose of these conferences was to present
new products and improvements, exchange experience and transfer expertise, in addition
to reinforcing the status of a company that was growing and stable in the long-term in spite
of its on-going separation from the strategic partner. Measuring conferences also provided
the opportunity to directly showcase the company’s research and development facilities,
including remote ones, as one of the executives commented: “Buyers already visited us here
on the hill where we make aluminium casings, and they can see first-hand it’s not a cheap
product but rock solid”. Throughout this stage of model transformation, communication
was supported by sales engineering and regular participation in established international
trade and industry fairs, alongside the extensive dissemination of information via the
company’s website and digital channels.
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3.6 Phased Separation Strategy
When one side in strategic partnerships feels the deal is no longer working in its favour,
it will attempt to rearrange the cooperation conditions or cease partnership. In the latter
case, the process of separation is a delicate one since partners have a limited time window
to organize any capabilities they are now missing, and prove to customers that they are still
worthy of trust even when operating as independent entities. In this context, respondents
stated that the accurate interpretation and assessment of the business behaviour of the
former partner was crucial in the process of decision-making and market positioning,
as both executives agreed. The one of them stated: “We realized that our strategic partner
was looking for ways to become more independent from Dewesoft, and that meant we had to
become more independent, too. That was the breaking point in our cooperation.”
Knowing that they will compete on the same market, and initially for the same exact
customers, Dewesoft chose to first offer similar products based on different technology,
which were not directly competing with the range offered by the former partner, as
illustrated by the following statement of the CEO: “When we started making instruments,
we said we’d make something they don’t carry, so there would be no hard feelings.” When
Dewesoft finally started competing with its former ally, it did not try to dump prices but
instead offered superior products at the same price. The company’s capacity for rapid
development then allowed it to quickly position itself in those technology fields that were
still unoccupied by the former partner. As one senior engineer said: “We’re quite good
when it comes to data acquisition, we have a lot of range there, and now we want to explore
the controller side, data output. A completely new field that would really set us apart from
our previous ally.”
In a strategic partnership, the most suitable strategy is agreement on a period of continued
cooperation. Judging by the respondents’ statements, we were able to conclude the
company first secured all the personnel deemed necessary for technologic development,
and then focused on the establishment of its own sales framework. One of the cofounders
stated the following: “Our next step was how to persuade and motivate the sales channels in
the network of our ex strategic partner to start selling our hardware, initially still under the
same name as before and then soon under the Dewesoft brand.”
To manage two business models simultaneously, the firm has to design a context that will
allow it to achieve a delicate balance. In the case of Dewesoft, we recognised a slightly
different approach. During the BMT, they used the new business model more and more;
however, they never ceased using the first model for two pragmatic reasons. The first is
that customers who use the product from the first business model could become their first
tier customers in the future, and the second is that the revenue stream of the first business
model was still substantial.
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4 DISCUSSION
This exploratory research resulted in 6 drivers of successful BMT and 17 sub-categories.
Transformational Leadership. Leadership theory affirms that there are two distinct but
interrelated types of leadership: transactional and transformational (Yukl, 2010). Our
study found that executives are the leading force of BMT, especially the CTO of the
company and the main shareholder, who never works from a position of authority. They
inspired co-workers or “members of the team”, as the CTO always expressed himself
during interviews, and motivated them by personal behaviour, learning abilities and
technological professionalism. Researchers in previous studies have not defined what
types of leaders have led BMT, with few exceptions. Sosna et al. (2010) identified that the
exploratory phase of the transformation of the business model was “strongly influenced”
by the entrepreneur or owner-manager who was the main decision-maker and “was
encouraging his team to learn and experiment by sharing information and was involving
them in decision making”, which are all elements of transformational leadership.
Discovery Driven Decision-Making. In highly uncertain, complex and fast-moving
environments, experimentation and, consequently, evolutionary learning are the “tools
of choice” for how to discover the most effective business model, since they cannot be
fully anticipated in advance (McGrath, 2010). Our study found that the business model
was not exactly innovative and new to this world, but it was highly new to the firm. The
research also confirmed that experimentation and effectuation was a “state of mind” in the
company for learning and gaining relevant experience on how to adjust different aspects
of the company to the emerging business model. We found that the researched company
performed experiments and effectuation in very different fields, such as technology (new
instruments), acquisition (an offer to buy the strategic partner), market access (web sales),
human resource motivation (an incentive scheme) or even at the level of product name
development. Not all experiments were successful (web sales, acquisition); however,
within the company they were treated as failures rather than mistakes (Sosna et al., 2010).
In our study, we found a close connection between discovering and deciding or taking
action (Casadesus-Masanel & Ricart, 2011), such as: success with the first instrument
(experiment) led to global web sales (decision); global web sales failure (experiment) led
to opening the first sales office abroad (decision); acquisition of strategic partner failed
(experiment), which led to a stronger HW development team in the company (decision).
Industry Improvement - Customer Specific Orientation. Our study’s findings confirm that
Dewesoft’s customer value proposition was changed, adapted and improved during the
process of BMT. It was especially important because Dewesoft was co-creating solutions
with the customers who were simultaneously customers of their previous strategic partner.
Dewesoft did not strive just to maximize shareholder wealth; in fact, it was just the opposite:
they strove to find ways of maximising the use of technology which was locked into the
initial business model and to develop new types of measuring instruments and solutions,
all in line with their “world view”. They made sure that all users who already bought a
licence, and with it access to the latest technology, had free access to the SW solutions
developed for any specific customers. That means that all Dewesoft’s customers who
work in a “virtual network”, unintentionally, but on the other hand consciously and with
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formal consent, help each other and share best practices and knowledge, which embodies
Dewesoft’s capabilities in its products. With such an approach, all customers from the
same industry benefit and improvements quickly move the boundaries of an industry’s
capabilities far ahead. Such cooperation is understood as an extension of customer value
co-creation, where a supplier-customer relation is in the foreground (Galvagno & Dalli,
2014), compared to our findings, which put in the foreground the supplier–customer–
industry relation. Such an approach is in line with calls for “creating shared values”, as in
the case of Nike (Epstein, Buhovac, & Yuthas, 2010).
Phased Separation Strategy. Our study results confirmed that making a distinction
between companies was an important characteristic of a phased separation strategy. A
company should implement distinction in accordance with careful sensing and evaluating
partner moves in the strategic alliance separation process (Peng & Shenkar, 2002). If both
partners compete on the same market for the same customers, this is an even more sensible
process. In our case, there was a very unique situation because Dewesoft was developing a
new business model and simultaneously running the old one. That is a common situation
when both partners depend on each other because they serve the same customers, and,
during the separation process, assure relevant capabilities which are no more accessible
from the previous partner. During the BMT, Dewesoft was in a position to run its first
business model: selling its own SW solution to the strategic partner. Simultaneously, they
started running another business model in which they were selling, at the beginning, their
HW solutions via the partner’s sales network to the end users. The same approach was
later adopted with selling complete solutions via their own sales network while keeping
the original business model active the entire time. Spatial separation (Markides, 2013) of
business models is not relevant in cases where the resources and capabilities needed to run
both business model can synergize each other.
Besides confirming four already recognized drivers, our study revealed two additional
BMT-related drivers which surfaced during the strategic alliance separation. The first one
is self-initiative collaborators. BMT requires high flexibility not only among management
but also among employees (Cummings & Worley, 2009), who should be self-motivated to
change (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2000). Various study results suggest that distrust often
motivates employees to hide knowledge from their colleagues (Connelly, Zweig, Webster,
& Trougakos, 2012), which was not the case in our research. We found that a high degree
of trust among employees correlated with transformational leadership, which resulted in
employee participation in the internal transfer of knowledge, and in fast and innovative
development and upgrade of existing solutions. An even greater challenge in organizations
is how to prepare employees not only to change and adapt to the new business model,
but also to encourage their creativity and active involvement during its transformation.
A number of studies have investigated the relationship between leadership style and
employee creativity (Amabile, Schatzel, Moneta, & Kramer, 2004; Zhang & Bartol, 2010).
Both characteristics were influenced by the technological vision of the company and the
capabilities of its employees, while taking into account the situational characteristics in
the relationship with its strategic partner (agreed limited time frame for achieving product
comparability) presented a huge challenge.
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According to Biggemann’s case study, information sharing plays an essential role in
relationship development among business partners (Biggemann, 2012), and contentoriented communication is another driver which was revealed in our study. The importance
of communication in the opposite situation is noted by Epstein in a study of drivers of
successful post-merger integration (Epstein, 2004). Among the five drivers which Epstein
recognised, a strong emphasis is placed on communication. We found a similar situation
in our study, keeping in mind that the companies did not merge, but rather diverge. The
executives at Dewesoft were aware that planned communication was vital to build trust
for further continuous cooperation with the customers. During the process of dissolving
the strategic partnership, they strengthened the relationship with the customers in such a
way to ensure trust and long-term predictability related to future development, which was
achieved by a multi-channel approach. For example: they implemented internal measuring
conferences at the company’s location, performed customer visits, were in online contact,
attended international conferences, and implemented an online learning platform. A
similar approach was established with the distributors’ network, which did not exist under
the name Dewesoft until mid-2010 when the first distributor was established.
5 CONCLUSION
Based on case study results, this paper aims to contribute to the understanding of critical
drivers for successful BMT and to the knowledge of business models and their successful
transformation. Moreover, it aims to supplement the set of clarified drivers of successful
BMT. It also provides confirmation that previously recognized drivers are valid in the
context of strategic alliance separation.
From the managerial perspective, it is important to understand that while transformational
leadership has a pivotal role in the process of BMT, one should not neglect the role of
other drivers which are considered to intermediate between transformational leadership
and phased separation strategy. Since the final outcome of BMT is highly unpredictable,
organisations have to be willing to discover new possibilities of doing business while
effectively running the existing business. This is especially challenging when the
organization carries out the BMT and, at the same time, separates itself from a longterm strategic partner to operate in the same market for the same customers. In such
a situation, BMT should lead the organisation to position itself uniquely and be ready
to explore the opportunities in different, not just technological directions. Thus, the
information obtained from discovery driven experimentation is vital for the adoption of
strategic decisions of top management.
Openness to exploring should not only be limited to top management, as it is also crucial
in the technological sense because it encourages all employees to continuously discover
new possibilities for further technological development and distinction from the former
partner. If non-technological experimentation is associated with the question of how
to enter the market and be different from competitors, technological experimentation
should prompt cooperation with customers. For the establishment of such cooperation,

N. SAVIČ, I. OGRAJENŠEK, A. REJC BUHOVAC | THE DRIVERS OF SUCCESS IN BUSINESS MODEL ...

119

it is essential that there is some collaboration even before the introduction of BMT and
that customers already have positive experience with it. Therefore, content-oriented
communication is crucial to achieve customers’ confidence in cooperation and at the same
time confidence in the longevity and reliability of co-created solutions. It is important
that the substantive communication is multi-layered and includes technologically modern
channels of communication, in addition to standard communication forms. Involving
customers in the creation of solutions and also sharing these solutions between all existing
customers is one of the most important building blocks of creating a relationship with the
company and the willingness to walk together along an unknown route during the BMT.
An extremely important dimension of BMT are employees who should not only be willing
to follow the management’s vision, but wish to proactively co-create transformation. In the
researched company, it turned out that one of the main features of employees during the
BMT was their readiness for learning and disseminating the knowledge and experience
acquired. Without top managers and employees in key positions who demonstrated both
personal characteristics—that is, acquiring and disseminating knowledge—BMT would
hardly be likely.
An exploratory study has, in its nature, a number of limitations. We conducted research
on a unique single case, which limits the observed variability and decreases the external
validity. We are unable to generalize the findings to other types of companies because
the business model under investigation relates to a medium-sized and innovative
globally-oriented high-tech company. On the other hand, case studies are generalizable
to theoretical propositions (Yin, 2003). This is the first study, to our knowledge, which
research a BMT during the process of strategic alliance separation and we hope that our
work will lead to more theory driven research. Another limitation is that the research was
performed by a single investigator, which did not allow for investigator triangulation. To
avoid subjective interpretation of the collected data, we regularly checked our findings
with the key informants after each research sequence.
Careful examination of the business model suggests that this topic is in its early stages
of development. Here, we provide suggestions on where the priorities for future model
development might lie. The drivers we discovered are contextually conditioned, meaning
there is a realistic possibility that other drivers in another research context exist,
which could have a profound influence on successful BMT. Future research in another
organizational setting may enrich the set of identified drivers. The characteristics of the
identified drivers could be enlarged by research in other types of organizations. Based
on the identified drivers, a multi-case study would be a great opportunity to check and
confirm the replicability of the proposed drivers of successful BMT.
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Appendix 1: Research sequences and guiding research questions
Research sequence 1
Research sequence 2
Research sequence 3
September 2013 – April 2014 June 2014 – November 2014 November 2014 – June 2015
Guiding research questions
in the first research sequence
•W
 hat was the course of your
BMT from the time of your
company’s establishment up
until now?
•W
 hy did you decide to
transform your business
model and in what ways did
you achieve this task?
• What were the characteristics
of the BMT process?

Guiding research questions
in the second research
sequence
• Do the interviews and their
data describe the process of
BMT to a sufficient degree?
• Have we missed any
significant factors or
events that also affected
the process of the model’s
transformation?
• Which changes occurred
during the past 8 months of
BMT (9/2013 – 6/2014)?
• Which changes occurred
during the past 4 months of
BMT (8/2014 – 11/2014)?

Guiding research questions in
the third research sequence
• How was the development
and transformation of the
Dewesoft business model
perceived by the cofounders /
senior engineers / employees
/ external partners of the
company?
• How do the cofounders /
senior engineers / employees
/ external partners of the
company interpret the key
characteristics of their BMT?

Drivers of the tentative
model 1
• Technology Vision
• Industry Solution
• Customer Co-creation
• Experimenting
• Collaboration with
Cofounders
• Scientific Orientation

Drivers of the tentative
model 2
• Technology Envisioning
• Industry Improvement
Solution
• Customer Co-creation
• Experimenting

Drivers of the final model
• Transformational Leadership
• Industry Improvement –
Customer Specific Orientation
• Discovery Driven Decision
Making
• Content-oriented
Communication
• Self-initiative Collaborators
• Phased Separation Strategy

Data sources:
•C
 TO and CEO, external
documentation

Data sources:
• CTO and CEO, external
documentation, internal
documentation

Data sources:
• CTO and CEO, external
documentation, internal
documentation, other
informants (cofounders,
engineers, employers,
partners)
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Appendix 2: Illustrative codes for one of the drivers (transformational leadership) at the end
of the 3rd research sequence
High quality focus

Technology vision

World view

1. Orientation towards
top-quality products
with global demand G1.1
2. Improving and
speeding up
procedures - G3.3
3. F
 ocus on technological
perfection - G1.1, G1.2
4. F
 ocus on the constant
updating of successful
products - G1.1
5. U
 nderstanding that
gradual development
is an essential part of
creating stable platforms
- G1.1
6. O
 ptimum vs. maximum
- G1.1
7. S imple yet high
performance products
- G4.3
8. ”Apple” quality - G4.3
9. C
 ancelling projects
or manufacture when
quality is subpar - G4.3
10. A
 wareness of things
that need change and
how to go about it G4.3
11. L
 ooking two or even
three steps ahead G4.3
12. A
 bility to maintain
high productivity in
stressful situations G4.3
13. I dentifying and
addressing any
recurring errors in the
work process - G4.3
14. M
 aking a truly
valuable instrument
- G5.3

1. Personal technology vision
- G1.2
2. Technological insight and
understanding - G3.3
3. Knowledge of potential
technology development
avenues - G1.1
4. 5-year plan of future
technology development G1.1
5. Guiding the technological
development of customers,
too - G1.1
6. Technological management
alongside technology vision
- G1.1
7. Strive to be ”cutting edge” in
the technology sense - G1.1
8. Personal vision of company
development - G1.2
9. Development of the vision in
harmony with the needs of
customers and the direction of
the industry’s trends - G3.3
10. New technology vision - G3.3
11. Cooperating in the vision’s
implementation - G3.3
12. Global reach and availability
- G3.3
13. Focus on the connection
between SW and HW - G3.3
14. Technology vision as a
foundation of business
transformation - G3.3
15. Co-creating the company
vision - G3.3
16. Vision that brings employees
together - G3.3
17. Jure’s vision is our prime
directive - G3.3
18. The power of technological
aspirations - G5.3

1. Employees own a stake in
the company - G1.2
2. Jure has ”a big heart” - G3.3
3. S taying open to cooperation
with external parties - G1.1
4. M
 aintaining a ”go with the
flow” business culture - G1.1
5. E
 nsuring financial
independence - G1.1
6. M
 aintaining ownership
independence - G1.1
7. A
 pplicative research
entrepreneurship culture G1.1
8. F
 reedom to make decisions
- G1.1
9. O
 rganic growth - G1.1
10. C
 o-operative and coownership models involving
employees - G1.1
11. S ensitivity to the progress
of broader society - G1.1
12. H
 elping develop the
industry - G1.1
13. A
 voiding the inverse effect
of stagnant capital - G1.1
14. F
 ostering personal
independence - G1.2
15. R
 esearch and applicative
freedom - G1.2
16. M
 aking money is not the
primary focus - G1.2
17. Technology-driven
development - G1.2
18. H
 elping make the world a
better place - G1.2
19. C
 alm and respectful pose
- G1.2
20. P
 rofessional transformation
- G2.3
21. S eparation but staying on
good and productive terms
- G2.3
22. P
 ersonal respect and
consideration - G3.3, G4.3

Legend: G1.1 – Interviews conducted with group G1 during the first research sequence; G1.2 – Interviews
conducted with group G1 during the second research sequence; G3.3, G4.3, G5.3 – Interviews conducted with
groups G3, G4 or G5 during the third research sequence.
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Appendix 3: Illustrative quotes, observations and excerpts for transformational leadership at
the end of the 3rd research sequence
High Quality Focus
Orientation towards top
end quality and globally
useful products: ”Our
motto was always to
make one thing but make
it incredibly well, then
Interview – try to sell it in as many
geographical regions
G1 only
and application fields as
possible.” G1.1

Make even better
products even faster:
”It’s an everyday thing
for us, thinking how
to increase the quality
Interview –
and pace of production.
G2, G3, G4
These two are constant
or G5
questions.” G3.3

Technology Vision

World View

Personal technology
vision: ”Our longterm plans are always,
personally up to me.
That’s something I reserve
for myself, it’s just how
it is. Back when we were
aligned, I felt we lacked
a solid long-term vision,
in the sense of knowing
exactly where we wanted
to be, say, three years down
the line. It’s something that
was missing.” G1.2
Technological visionary:
”If I had to compare Jure
to Franz and Herbert,
I’d say the two of them
are more like salesmenentrepreneurs while he is
more of a technological
visionary.” G3.3

Employee co-ownership:
”My goal is to run a company
whose success benefits
everyone involved, which
means employees should have
a stake in the company. I also
want them to keep running
the company when it’s time for
me to step back…” G1.2

Jure has ”a big heart”: ”Our
CTO has tons of hands-on
experience in addition to
being well versed in theoretical
concepts, and he’s able to
develop a clear vision for the
future, like a Steve Jobs for
example, only that Jure has
a really big heart ... which
maybe wasn’t that true for
Jobs as far as I understood
from the book.” G3.3
During my first tour of
At the Measuring
Dewesoft supports young
the company, the CEO
Conference in April 2015
entrepreneurs in a similar way
led me from product to
I was there when the CTO to the support they received
product and explained
predicted and presented
from the Austrian cofounders.
why each one performs
the technological novelties They have launched a startwell and how it had
for the following 5 years
up accelerator, provided
Direct
in the section Area 51.
entrepreneurs with knowobservation been improved from
its previous version.
(observation at biannual
how, and allow them to use
(observation during site measurement conference) Dewesoft facilities and test
walk)
equipment. (observation
during informal conversation
and site walk)
”If we compare the
”SIRIUS is not just a new ”Capital and companies
program solution
measurement instrument, owned by financial
DeweSoft X1 to X2, the
it’s the first in a brand new conglomerates stagnate, as
reaction time of output
generation on the market. they are subject to the inverse
vs input decreased a lot. By developing our own
effect of focusing on capital
This is allowing almost
sales network, we aim to
– if your fundamental goal is
Documents real time command
become a fully independent just to make money, you will
- excerpts execution and is possible global provider of high-end generally be less successful in
only because we are
solutions in measuring
the long term, and ultimately
developing both hardware technology.”
make less money, too.”
and software in-house
which enables us to push
the limits of our solution.”

